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Schönheit ist Vollkommenheit mit Freiheit. 
Goethe1 
 
The coherence of Kant’s socalled third Critique is ambiguous despite the task 
that Kant undertakes to solve in it. As the title suggests and Kant’s analyses 
show it is the aim of the work to determine the transcendental conditions of 
reflective judgment including the application of its principles on aesthetic and 
natural phenomena which do not fall under scientific investigations but which 
are still based on the cognitive powers of the mind. It is commonly agreed 
that an inner connection of the two parts of the work – the critique of 
aesthetic and teleological judgment respectively  - is unlikely and that any 
attempt to argue that they form a unity is risqué2. Despite its relation to the 
powers of cognition (imagination and understanding) the reflective judgment 
excersises its activity in two respects, namely in relation to aesthetic 
phenomena – the beauty of nature and of fines arts – and in relation to 
organic nature. These phenomena belong to strictly separate areas. Judgments 
about organic nature are teleological in the sense that they project a concept 
of purpose at the basis of the object for cognitive reasons; they aim at 
knowledge of how organic processes work. Against that, the aesthetic 
judgment is – Kant says – indifferent to the knowledge of its object; it 
concerns the beauty of the object just focusing on the object’s sensible form 
in so far as the judgment of this form occasions a feeling of delight in us. 
Whereas the teleological judgment thus claims to be objective (though Kant’s 
critique shows that it fails to be so), the aesthetic judgment expresses the 
                                                          
1 Goethe (1955): 21-23 
2 Höffe (2008): 7-8 
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subjective affection we experience via the judgment of the (aesthetically 
relevant) form of the object. 
It is this separation that I intend to question. I suggest that both aesthetic 
and teleological judgment respectively express ways of cognizing the world 
that do not exclude but rather supplement each other. More specifically, I 
argue that all through his third Critique Kant tries to keep separate what are 
really two different aspects of one and the same issue, namely the cognition of 
organic nature through a conceptual (scientific) and through a sensous 
(aesthetical) approach. This enterprise is controversial but among other things 
it contributes to support Kant’s own intention with the third Critique, namely 
to bridge a gap between his theoretical and practical philosophy. It is the core 
issue of this work to show how the laws of freedom whose foundation is 
demonstrated in the socalled second Critique can be regarded as compatible 
with the laws of nature whose foundation is demonstrated in the socalled first 
Critique. Kant holds that for systematic reasons a concept of nature is needed 
that can unite the laws of nature with the laws of freedom3. It is this “Grund 
der Einheit”4 aimed at by systematic philosophy that hardly can be compatible 
with the division of the third Critique in two separate parts that treat the 
aesthetical and respectively the teleological function of the reflective 
judgment. To be specific, I argue that it is not possible to separate what Kant 
calls the subjective, formal purposiveness from the objective, real 
purposiveness. Though beauty certainly is subjective in the sense that it causes 
delight by vitalizing our sensuous, corporeal nature, it is nevertheless founded 
on our judgment of the form of the object. Against that, Kant holds that the 
aesthetic qualities of the object are not objective properties or at least they are 
not significant for cognition. For example, we do not need to know what 
species an individual plant belongs under in order to estimate its beauty. Its 
climbing up the wall or its harmonious stature express a structure or a play 
that immediately appeals to our sensuality via our imagination and evokes 
delight as such. Kant thus distinguishes between subjective, formal and 
objective, cognitive properties.  
                                                          




However this distinction between aesthetical features and objective 
proporties is hardly tenable; it is based on the premises of Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy that objectivity is constituted by sensible intuition 
and categories of understanding. In his theoretical philosophy Kant restricts 
the application of the transcendental apparatus to be applied just to the 
cognition of spatio-temporal entities and their causal connections  - the 
material world. But in the third Critique he adresses aesthetic and organic 
phenomena and at the outset he suggests that a critique of the cognition of 
organic phenomena challenges the ontology implied by his own 
transcendental framework. In this paper I elaborate further on this challenge 
which Kant himself leaves behind. I suggest that the analytic of the beautiful 
contains concepts some of which resist a just transcendental justification 
because they also imply an objective reflection of the structure of the aesthetic 
object that connects the aesthetic attitude to the cognition of organic nature. 
The connecting point in the transition from the transcendental reflection to 
an objective reflection of aesthetic and organic phenomena will be Kant´s 
own concept of imagination (Germ. Einbildungskraft). I suggest that Kant’s 
notion of imagination as an activity that works independently of 
understanding is intimately related to what he calls the “free formation of 
nature”5. Imagination is thus not just a power of the mind but it exhibits a 
regularity that makes it a kind of organ for cognizing the living character of 
organic objects. As such it supplies abstract understanding (Germ. ‘Verstand’) 
by reuniting it with intuition. 
In the “Analytic of the Beautiful” in the third Critique Kant tries to 
establish a position between a rationalist and an empiricist account of the 
judgment of taste. On the one side he rejects the rationalist view of beauty as 
a sensuous representation of the perfection of nature, a knowledge of nature’s 
order based on the senses. On the other side he attempts to steer free of a 
purely empirical, physiological account represented by British empiricism 
(Burke; Hume). The problem that Kant sees in rationalist aesthetics is that it 
did not respect the autonomy of the aesthetic judgment. From Leibniz and 
Wolff to Baumgarten and Mendelsohn beauty had been treated as an 
                                                          
5  Germ. “freie Bildung der Natur”, cf. Kant (2009): §58. 248/B 249. 
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appendage to knowledge and though gradually being developed to become a 
discipline based on own independent rules for organising sensuous 
representations in for instance poetry, aesthetics in this tradition never 
detached definitively but remained a “gnoseologia inferior”, a science based 
on the inferior cognitive organs, the senses, an “analogia rationis” (cf. 
Baumgarten). Kant joins this tradition but he takes the final step and 
construes a philosophical aesthetics. He accomplishes the emancipation of the 
aesthetic judgment from the domaine of knowledge by focusing on the sphere 
of sensuous representations and the internal structure they make up as objects 
of the cognitive powers. In continuation of Baumgarten Kant adresses the 
logic of imagination in the production of fine art and in contemplation of 
natural beauty. By trying to demonstrate the rationality of aesthetic the 
judgment but – unlike Baumarten - without ascribing knowledge claims to it 
Kant thinks that he can keep aesthetics apart from epistemology. 
The emancipation of aesthetics from rationalism brings Kant near to 
empiricism. But though he approaches an empirical explanation of the 
aesthetic phenomenon by focusing on the sensuous representations he rejects 
an explanation that bases taste purely on pleasure as in British philosophy.6 
Burke’s grounding of the aesthetic judgment on feeling (Engl. ‘love’) tends 
towards a psycho-physiological explanation. According to Kant Burke and 
other empiricist theories do not succeed in justifying the claim to universality 
which according to Kant characterizes the aesthetic judgment. In his analysis 
of taste Kant argues for a connection between feeling and judgement, i.e. for 
the rational foundation of the judgement of taste. Just as it is the task for 
ethics and epistemology to argue for universal validity claims in issues of 
morals and knowledge respectively, so a critique of taste must be undertaken 
to justify that they are universal too.  
Unlike morals and and cognition that both base on concepts, taste is a 
matter of feeling but still not a private matter. In the judgment “The meadow 
is beautiul” the predicate is not related to the object but to the subject, i.e. 
feeling. This judgement is different from “the meadow is green” which relates 
the predicate to the object. But the relation between them is that the meadow 
                                                          
6 Kant (2009): B 128 ff. 
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is estimated as beautiful because it is green. I am allowed to state the feeling of 
delight in a judgement about the meadow because there is something about 
the meadow – its “greenness” - that generates that feeling of pleasure. So the 
judgment claims that it is a certain fact that generates a certain feeling of 
pleasure (Germ. “Wohlgefallen”). Therefore Kant says: we should speak as if 
the judgment of taste were objective. Similarly when I say “this is a rose” I 
express a certain knowledge by subsuming a particular under a concept, a 
species. But by claiming “this rose is beautiful” I refer to a certain relation 
between its qualities and parts, e.g. its upright posture, the colours, shapes and 
arrangement of its leaves. These facts are certainly properties and some of 
them form a part and determine what species it belongs to, but Kant seems to 
mean that it is not as properties but qua making up a certain structure that 
they make the rose appear beautiful to me. However the question is if Kant is 
correct in distinguishing the aesthetic features as just subjective from the real, 
objective properties.  
By excluding a merely empirical-physiological explanation of beauty 
Kant considers the rationality of the aesthetic judgement to be based on its 
universality. It expresses impartiality, it can be communicated and it claims 
universal consent. But by rejecting the conceptual foundation too Kant forms 
the concept of a “sensus communis” (Germ. “Gemeinsinn”). The “sensus 
communis” is responsible for our ability to judge universally about aesthetic 
phenomena independently of concepts. But this faculty has something 
obscure in it: how can feeling, a sense (‘Sinn’), devoid of conceptual content 
contain something universal ? For further justification of that claim Kant 
resorts to the idea that beauty appears to the aesthetical attitude as the result 
of a certain harmonious interplay between imagination and understanding 
occasioned by the perception of certain objects. Thus to guarantee the 
universal validity of the aesthetic judgement Kant displaces focus from sense 
(Germ. ‘Gemeinsinn’) to the cognitive powers of the mind. Whereas 
knowledge originates in imagination that synthesises the empirical manifold to 
understanding which then forms a concept, the aesthetic phenomenon is 
constituted by a free interplay of these two faculties. Kant speaks about the 
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“free regularity of imagination”7 and thereby he means that imagination 
functions relatively independently of but still in relation to understanding 
exclusively within the sphere of sensible representations. Consequently all 
knowing subjects can be expected to feel delight in similar objects in so far as 
these objects evoke the same interplay of the cognitive powers in all human 
beings. In this way Kant thinks that he can succeed in saving the universality 
of the aesthetic judgement without ascribing objective validity to it. 
But the question is whether Kant is justified in ignoring the significance 
of the object and in denying the aesthetic judgement any kind of knowledge. 
For it is the form of the object that occasions the interplay of the cognitive 
powers in the mind. Not all objects are beautiful. Kant has his reasons for 
insisting on speaking objectively about the beautiful; he intends to avoid the 
psycho-physiological explanation. He wants to be able to distinguish clearly 
between feeling of delight and desire. Whereas desire originates in our 
sensuous nature, feeling is distinquished by being related to the cognitive 
faculties. In §9  –  the key to the whole critique of taste - Kant explicitly 
distances himself from the empirical treatment; he argues that though the 
aesthetic judgement expresses delight, this feeling arises from the judgment. 
We do not estimate an object to be beautiful for private, abitrary reasons. It is 
the other way around: The rational estimation of the object precedes and 
conditions the feeling of pleasure. 
If we follow the line of this argument, the feeling of delight is universal 
because it originates in cognitive powers that are common to all rational 
beings. To be more specific: In contrast to cognitive judgments whose 
predicates express a property, the judgment of taste focuses on its aesthetical 
features, i.e. its harmony, and this does not express knowledge. Let us see how 
Kant explains the idea of the play of imagination which characterizes the 
aesthetic attitude. Kant says: “And although in the apprehension of a given 
object of sense it [i.e. imagination] is tied down to a definite form of the 
object and, to that extent, does not enjoy free play […], still it is easy to 
conceive that the object may supply ready-made to the imagination just such a 
form of the arrangement of the manifold, as the imagination, if it were left to 
                                                          
7  “Freie Gesetzmässigkeit der Einbildungskraft”, cf. (2009): 99/B 69 
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itself, would freely project in harmony with the general conformity to law of 
the understanding”8. The freedom of imagination that characterizes an act of 
contemplation of a beautiful object of nature or fine art thus consists in 
producing sensuous representations independently of any law or concept of 
the object. Still imagination works regularly because the representations it 
produces exhibit some kind a coherence or regularity. To avoid a paradox 
here Kant explains the freedom of the aesthetic activity as an interplay 
between imagination and understanding9. For instance, whereas a biologist 
illustrating a species is bound by a concept, a poet is free to create infinitely 
many images by the sight of a red rose. Nevertheless the poem is not just an 
arbitrary association of word images. The free – creative - activity - must 
somehow be related to the form of the object. And that is exactly what the 
above cited passage says: The structure of the sensuous representations (the 
object) must correspond to the regular activity of the imagination (the 
subject). The question is just how.  
It is not the ideal of fine arts to imitate a sensuous manifold; the artist 
creates his object and his creation of it - as well as the perception of it by a 
beholder - is accompanied by a vague idea of a law working behind the 
regularity of the representations. Beauty appears to the beholder in an act of 
contemplation or is created by an artist. There are thus subjective – 
transcendental - conditions for the appearance of the beautiful phenomenon. 
Though critical towards rationalist metaphysics, Kant keeps the rationalist idea 
that there is a supersensible aspect of beauty due to a characteristic structure 
that the judgment of taste expresses. But he traces this aspect back to the 
human mind considering it the product of a reflection on the activity of the 
cognitive powers. Kant distinguishes reflective judgment from determinant 
judgment. The latter is an ability to subsume a particular object under a given 
concept, a species or a law, and as such it expresses knowledge. Against that, 
reflective judgment does not dispose of concepts; it rises the cognitive attitude 
from a conceptual to a higher level; it synthezises particular laws or species of 
nature in order to form a transcendental notion (Germ. “Idee”) of, say, a 
                                                          
8 Kant (1952): 86. (1790): 241-242.  
9 Kant: (2009): 99-100/B 69; (1952): 86 
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hierarchy of species or a coherent system of natural laws. Reflective judgment 
disposes of a transcendental and heuristic idea of the ultimate unity of the 
world, a notion of totality that is meant to guide the scientific search for 
particular laws to explain empirical phenomena.  
Bearing in mind Kant’s distinction between concepts and notions 
(Germ. ‘Ideen’), between understanding and reason, developed in his first 
Crititique, the reflective judgment in the third Critique works on the treshold of 
the level of reason whereas determinant judgment performs functions of 
understanding. The reflective judgment adresses particular phenomena by 
considering them purposive for the notion of a total world order, like pieces 
of a puzzle that make the puzzle fall into place, one might say. But Kant 
distinguishes between kinds of application of reflective judgment. For not 
only has purposiveness a logical use as a heuristic principle for the scientific 
organization of species in a hierarchy of natural purposes to a unified system. 
It also has a teleological application in relation to the cognition of objects that 
are characterized by self-organization (Germ. “Selbstzweck”). Finally it has an 
aesthetical use in relation to beauty and the sublime. The teleological and the 
aesthetical judgment are the issues in the third Critique where Kant tries to 
explain organic and aesthetic phenomena.   
Reflective judgment brings Kant’s theory of the aesthetic attitude to its 
end. For it is by basing the analysis of aesthetic and organic objects on 
reflective and not on determinant judgment that Kant can perform his critique 
and thereby reveal the cognitive claims of teleological and aesthetical 
judgments as illusionary: they simply confuse conceps with a notion. It is 
Kant’s idea that a reflection on the harmonious interplay of imagination and 
understanding makes the notion of purposiveness at disposal for the aesthetic 
attitude as a substitute for the concept which the cognitive powers in vain seeks 
to add to the perception of the object. The regularity (“conformity to law”) of 
the sensous manifold that appears as beauty is not an appearance of an 
underlying law of nature that can be conceptualized; it appears due to the 
apparent purposiveness of the way in which the activity of imagination is 
harmononiously conformed to understanding.  
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We have here the exact point where Kant distinguishes the aesthetic 
from the cognitive judgment. For whereas the latter expresses a concept of an 
object by subsumtion, the former focuses on features that make the object 
appear as if it were organized purposively. However, since Kant rejects a 
metaphysical or theological explanation of beauty as the sensuous appearance 
of the world harmony or a divine intelligence, he interprets the order that 
appears as natural beauty as an analogy to human purposive action, but only 
as an analogy since nature does not act consciously. The plant that climbs up 
the wall and the bird’s ‘singing’ resemble but they are not expressions of 
purposive, i.e. conscious intentions. They are expressions of “purposiveness 
without a purpose”.  
But is Kant justified in explaining aesthetic phenomena within the 
framework of transcendental idealism; can he avoid a kind of realism? Surely, 
the autonomously working imagination provides us with the notion of human 
freedom. But on the other hand Kant cannot deny that it is the form of the 
object that gives rise to the free activity of imagination in the aesthetic 
contemplation by producing sensuous representations. That there is an 
objective condition is obvious in Kant´s treatment of fine arts. For 
interestingly enough Kant ascribes beauty to works of fine art only in so far as 
nature itself works in the creative act of the artist. Admittedly he distinquishes 
fine art from craft by its independence of any utility and conscious intention, 
i.e. concepts. The aesthetic quality of fine art consists in freely combined 
sensuous representations that please just as such. But though unbounded by 
concepts or laws, of what a thing should be, the genius who creates 
independently of conventional rules, traditions, taste and stile, is intimately 
joined to nature. Kant says: “Genius is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) 
through which nature gives the rule to art”10. The quality of a work of fine art 
depends partly on the artist not organizing his work from his aesthetic ideas 
(concepts) too deliberately. It is precisely when he creates as if nature 
prescribed the rules to him that his work is distinguished by the freedom 
which makes it beautiful whereas a predominantly deliberate production 
makes the work similar to works of craft in which the particular object are 
                                                          
10 Kant (1952): § 46, p. 168. (1790): 307. 
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determined by concepts. The poet creates freely but not arbitrarily when his 
creation imitates nature´s production and not just its products. The interesting 
point here is that fine arts can only be beautiful if they are natural and free at 
the same time. In fact, nature is conceived of as that which makes the creation 
free in the work of fine art. Consequently, freedom in the form of artistic 
creation must be regarded as a feature of nature appearing as beauty since 
natural beauty is paradigmatic and an ideal for the artist. 
Several parts of Kant´s theory points in the direction of an ontological 
aspect of the aesthetic phenomenon. It is especially remarkable that Kant 
intended his Critique of Judgement to mediate between the two other Critiques . 
The following remark from the “Introduction” is significant as regards the 
concept of nature that Kant lays at the basis of an aesthetic and a teleological 
investigation: Apart from the mechanistic concept of nature based on natural 
science “[…] nature must also be capable of being regarded in such a way that 
in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the possibility 
of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom”11. This 
sets the scene for speaking about living nature. At least a part of nature must 
be considered so that apart from mechanical laws, laws similar to the laws of 
freedom governs it. Organic nature, natural beauty, beauty of fine art and 
phenomena of crystallisation in inorganic nature are areas that can be 
conceived of as freedom prefigured in natural appearance.  
As already argued, Kant connects the idea of freedom to nature through 
the idea of a purpose. Freedom in nature would then be a purposive process 
resembling human, intentional action. At first sight aesthetic phenomena like 
the harmonious structure of the rose, the climbing up the wall of the plant 
and the bird´s singing, produce delight in the beholder exactly because they 
are forms and processes that seems to be both purposive and free. Kant here 
hints at the rationalist interpretation of these phenomena as appearances of a 
supersensible intelligence working behind the surface of nature. Kant himself 
refuses to postulate the notion of a divine intention as an explanatory 
instance. He does not reject the reality of such an intelligence but he denies 
human beings the power of an “intellectual intuition” which could justify the 
                                                          
11 Kant (1952): 14 
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notion. Purpose can only be accounted for in terms of human intentional 
actions. It involves consciousness and concepts. In Kant’s definition purpose 
is “the object of a concept so far as this concept is regarded as the cause of 
the object (the real ground of its possibility)”12. A process is purposive when it 
is directed towards the actualisation of a concept (species) as its end. But 
observation gives no evidence for ascribing intentions to natural beings. They 
are not directed towards ends. Consequently there is no freedom in nature. 
But Kant does seem ambiguous as regards imposing purposes on nature. 
There seems to be freedom-like feature in nature. In a final discussion of 
idealism versus realism of teleology Kant points to examples of leaps in 
natural processes. Nature seems to display “free formations” in the form of 
processes of crystallisation (snowflakes, ice-crystalls and the like) and in 
organic formations13. They are phenomena where quantitative changes, e.g. 
growth and change of temperature, result in qualitative changes (taking and 
changing form). They are leaps since they cannot be fully accounted for in a 
quantitative-mechanistic way. Still Kant shrinks from taking them seriously; 
firstly because freedom presupposes intended purposes, i.e. concepts which 
are foreign to the domains of natural science; secondly because according to 
Kant’s own transcendental idealism the notion of purposiveness only perform 
a regulative function in the scientific research. Conversely, aesthetic 
phenomena resist such a conceptional determination. Their harmonious play 
or structure can be perceived in an extensive variety of different phenomena: 
in organic nature, fine arts, the playing of light in crystals, the harmonious 
shape of the human body regardless of their natural classification. The 
aesthetically relevant structures cut across species and classes and as such they 
are irrelevant to concepts.  
But though Kant’s point here is clear and apparently convincing the 
features that are grasped in the aesthetic attitude could still have an 
ontological foundation. The bird´s singing; the plants climbing up the wall and 
the change of form during he growth of a plant are all different ways in which 
different kind of beings express and actualize their specific nature. Whereas 
                                                          
12 Kant (1952): 61. §10. (2009): 70/B 32 
13 Kant (1952): 217ff. (1790): 348 ff./§58 
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singing expresses animal nature, growth including change of form is a 
common property of organic nature; it belongs to their nature to be living. It 
could thus be an objection to Kant’s separation of aesthetics from scientific 
cognition to argue that knowledge of organic and semi-organic entities (for 
example crystallisation) involves a development of our cognitive powers. 
Understanding and determinant judgment may not suffice to grasp the 
peculiarity of these phenomena. We need to vitalize our cognitive powers and 
Kant’s analysis of aesthetical and teleological judgment could be regarded as 
the first step in the direction to let the perception of “free formations of 
nature” challenge our cognitive powers and to investigate their 
epistemological consequenses. Kant commences to take up this challenge 
though he finally shrinks back from it. In the second part of Critique of 
Judgement under the heading “Critique of Teleological Judgment” he examines 
the idea of a natural purpose in constitutive respect. His idea is that in 
contrast to mechanical-physical nature, organic nature seems to be 
characterized by self-organisation and self-production. It consists of free 
formations that grow and differentiate. The organic proces can be described 
as a complex interaction of interrelated parts and organs through which the 
whole individual produces and manintains itself by means of and in 
opposition to the surroundings. The organism as a whole exhibits self-activity 
which means that it is both cause and effect of itself14. A knowledge of 
organic nature thus seems to involve purpose, i.e. the concept of a “telos”: its 
parts are organs through which the individual maintains itself. 
Kant compares the teleological with a mechanistic explanation to 
examine the possibility of ascribing a constitutive function to the idea of a 
purpose in the cognition of organic nature. This investigation, however, turns 
out to the advantage of mechanicism since the assumption of a notion of a 
natural purpose would involve a projection of a divine intelligence onto 
nature. This would lead natural philosophy back to rationalism which 
presupposes man’s capability of an “intellectual intuition”, an ability to behold 
the supersensible foundation of nature. Such an assumption is groundless 
according to the empirically minded Kant.  
                                                          
14 Kant (1952): 16. §64  
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Kant´s rejection of rationalism seems reasonable at first sight since it 
reserves a heuristic function for the teleological judgment: When dissecting an 
organism in biology or anatomy the researcer asks for the purpose when he 
comes across a hitherto unknown organ. But he gets the answer when he has 
found the proper function of the organ, i.e. what it accomplishes for other 
organs and for the organism as a whole. The organic processes are to be 
explained as causally interdependent functions according to mechanical and 
chemical laws. We need thus the notion of organic nature as a purposive 
whole, but only as a transcendental clue in our search for empirical, causal 
explanations. Nevertheless, Kant´s solution to the antinomy between 
mechanical and teleological explanations of organisms suffers from an 
reduction. The price for chosing the purely mechanistic explanation is that the 
essential difference between physical and organic nature are blurred. Then 
nature as a whole would function entirely according to mechanical and 
chemical laws. But if a consequent scientific attitude consists in explaining and 
not in explaining away given natural phenomena, it must aknowledge that the 
peculiarity of life phenomena makes a challenge to our cognitive powers. A 
consequence could be to say that in organic processes mechanical and 
teleological aspects are interwoven: the parts and organs are mutually 
dependent but they are also integrated in the proces of a whole individual 
which produces and upholds itself by means of these processes. Observing 
the interaction of the parts systematically we are led to the notion of their 
unity by forming the concept of an individual that actualises its species 
through its differentiation. There are thus purposes, self-actualisation, in play 
(i.e. not consciously) in these “free formations” of organic nature; the 
phenomena teach us that. 
Maybe we actually do not dispose of the “intellectual intuition” that 
according to Kant is a precondition for being able to justify the use of 
teleological concepts in biological explanations. But instead of categorically 
denying ourselves its possibility we could begin by contemplating the living 
world with its endless variety and inexhaustible surplus of forms and 
individuals and take it as a challenge to our cognitive faculties. Then it may 
turn out to be sensible to consider the possibility of vitalizing our cognitive 
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powers in such a way that they become fit for grasping the living world as a 
dialectics between manifold and unity. For the purpose of making life 
intelligible imagination would play a central role. Imagination is not just an 
ability to synthezise a sense manifold to provide the observational basis for 
abstraction and idealisation in cognition. As Kant’s analysis shows imagination 
contains potentials to work in conformity with living nature and thus to 
vitalize the conceptual unities of our knowledge to make the living, freedom-
like aspects of organic objects intelligible. For organic beings are characterized 
by both freedom and necessity: “necessity” because  they are bound to their 
species; but “freedom” because it belongs to their nature as living beings to 
take form and to actualise themselves in variety of ways. 
Finally a concluding remark about the connection of the first and the 
second part of Kants Critique of Judgement. As already suggested, aesthetics 
could supply the cognition of organic nature if we accepts Kant’s idea of a 
free regularity of imagination that corresponds with the “free formations of 
nature”. Indeed Kant´s analysis of the judgment of taste seems far away from 
his natural teleology. But on a closer inspection it might not be so foreign to it 
after all: Kant maintained a gap between the aesthetic and the teleological 
judgment because he distinguished between objective properties and 
subjective, aesthetic features of objects. Focusing primarily on the subjective 
effect, the delight evoked by the perception of beautiful objects, he 
underestimated the significance of the fact that an objective arrangement – i.e. 
“the form of the object” and not just the powers of cognition - is the 
condition for the emergence of the feeling of delight. His reason for this 
underestimation is that an objective condition for the judgment of taste would 
either be raw sense impressions as claimed by empiricism or a supersensible, 
metaphysical (divine) being as in rationalism. However, these positions are 
both untenable, the former due to the failure to explain the structure 
(regularity) of the aesthetic phenomenon; the latter because it rests on a 
metaphysical assumption which can not be justified by rational means because 
the human intellect is not capable of an intellectual intuition. 
Nevertheless Kant keeps a touch of understanding for an ontological 
determination of beauty. For example, the judgment “this is indeed a beautiful 
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woman” implies “a concept of what the thing is intended to be”15. The 
example of beauty as appearance of perfection presupposes a concept as the 
determining ground. The beholder is led to think that “in her form nature 
excellently portrays the ends present in the female figure”16. But though Kant 
here admits that concepts and norms often play a crucial part in our aesthtic 
judgments he regards “free beauty”, i.e. works of fine art without purposes, as 
paradigmatic and he considers works of fine art – and natural objects as in the 
above mentioned example - that represent an ideal or norm (perfection) not 
“purely-aesthetic”17. According to Kant it is essential that beauty expresses 
freedom in the sense of being an appearance that pleases the senses 
unintendedly and for exclusively aesthetic reasons.  
But the dethronement of the rationalistic notion of beauty as perfection 
that follows from ascribing a higher aesthetical quality to free beauty is not 
just due to Kant’s general critical attitude towards the rationalist notion of 
purposes in nature. In fact Kant does not deny works of fine art all aesthetical 
quality just because the notion of perfection is metaphysically encumbered. 
His general devaluation of beauty as perfection in appearance is due to the 
fact that the motives of that kind of fine art must be limited to representations 
of man since man is the only being who by nature is intended for perfection. 
Man’s rationality, including his ability to determine his ends by reason, makes 
him exist as an end in himself18 in contrast to natural beings whose behaviour 
is bound to their specific character. In so far a representation of man’s 
perfection can be produced in fine art it makes the only possible example of 
“ideal beauty”19. 
But this limitation of ideal beauty rests on an odd and hardly convincing 
argument. Firstly, Kant’s idea of ideal beauty runs counter to his own warning 
against a confusion of the sensible with the intellegible sphere that the 
rationalists rendered themselves guilty of. On the premisses of Kant’s 
philosophy it is impossible to bridge the gap between thinking and sensation 
                                                          
15 Kant (1952): 173. (1790): 311. §48 
16 Ibid. 
17 Kant (1952): 73 (1790): 230. 




(“Denken” and “Sinnlichkeit”)20. But obviously fine art, e.g. portraits, can 
represent the spiritual character of a person visually. And secondly and more 
importantly, as argued above there are good reasons for claiming that 
perfection is not totally absent in the processes of organic beings in general. 
For instance growth can not be conceived of just as a gradual (quantitative) 
increase in extent and weight; it has an aspect of form and differentiation 
directed towards a climax followed by stagnation and withering. Features of 
formation and direction towards an end in the form of a totally realized 
species in individual shape might thus not be adequately grasped or accounted 
for by general and abstract concepts of species. Concepts contain essences of 
organisms in the shape of thought. By contrast, the living and freedom-like 
features of organic beings are bound up with the sensously given appearance 
and that makes fine art a more suitable organ for conceiving of and expressing 
exactly the structures that characterize life. There is no reason for totally 
denying the living nature a kind of underlying purpose and perfection though 
in most of its species - excepts in human being – these specific principles do 
not work due to intentions and concepts like in conscious human life. 
Kant´s general rejection of a connection between aesthetics and 
knowledge rests on the presupposition that the free formations in natural 
beings are incompatible with their being bound to the necessity of laws or 
species. But there seems to be a way of connecting them if it is admitted that 
the free formation of nature actually exist. Kant himself actually expressed 
guarded but unequivocal sympathy towards the “realism of the aesthetic 
finality of nature” by drawing attention to a apparent concordance between 
on the one side the organic world with its endless variety of species, forms, 
colours and shapes and on the other side our power of imagination. This 
concordance – says Kant - gives rise to “the plausible assumption that 
beneath the production of the beautiful there must lie a preconceived idea in 
the producing cause – that is to say an end acting in the interest of our 
imagination”21. This assumption makes it obvious to underline the objective 
                                                          
20 Cf. Critique of pure Reason, “Introduction” where Kant speaks of ”Verstand” and 
”Sinnlichkeit” as two distinct sources of knowledge. B 29 
21 Kant (152): 216-217. (1790): 347. § 58 
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aspect of the aesthetic judgment that the feeling of delight (Germ. 
“Wohlgefallen”) is occasioned by the interplay between the cognitive powers, 
the interplay which nature itself gives rise to. The richness of nature is structured so 
that the mind which attempts to grasp it must activate a power that is 
congenial with it, namely imagination. Following this thread in Kant’s 
thought, it would be reasonable to say this: the freedom that judgment 
connects to by reflecting on the interplay of the cognitive powers is not just 
the notion that stems from practical reason; before reflective judgment 
connects the aesthetic phenomenon to the realm of freedom at all, it finds it 
prefigured in nature as organic and semi-organic phenomena and in works of 
fine art.  
However, the choice of realism would have subversive consequences for 
the whole project of the third Critique. The claim of an aesthetic knowledge 
and the ascribtion of a constitutive role to the idea of teleology in cognitive 
respect contradicts Kant’s whole idea of a critique of judgment as just a 
critique and not a doctrine.22 It is Kant’s explicit view that the objects of the 
aesthetic and the teleological judgment - beauty and organic nature - do not 
make up a third realm besides the realms of nature and of freedom thematized 
in the theoretical and the practical philosophy respectively. The critique of 
both aesthetical and teleological judgment is meant to uncover the illusion 
that arises as a projection of principles taken from the sphere of the conscious 
human action onto nature where they are disguised as purpose and perfection. 
The reality that the third Critique treats is really the transcendental realm of 
practical philosophy. Beauty as the symbol of the good and organic nature are 
really (practical) purposiveness without a purpose.  
But this conclusion is hardly compatible with Kant’s original intention 
that the third Critique should bridge the gap between the first and the second 
Critique.  Denying the two kinds of judgment any objective correlation, it is 
difficult to see that Kant has done justice to the intention stated in the 
“Introduction”, namely to regard nature “in such a way that in the conformity 
to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the possibility of the ends to be 
                                                          
22 Klemme, Heiner F.: ”Einleitung” in: Kant, I: Kritik der Urteilskraft. Felix Meiner Verlag. 
Hamburg 2009. p. XXII. 
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effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom. – There must, therefore, be 
a ground of the unity of the supersensible that lies at the basis of nature 
[…]”23. The unification of the two Critiques that Kant ends up completing in 
the third Critique ignores the ontological independence of one of its 
components, namely nature, wherefore the unification fails. 
The fact that Kant ignores the ontological aspect is problematic since 
judgments actually state matters of fact on the basis of perception that has an 
objective correlate. The reason is firstly that Kant rejects rationalist 
metaphysics and the ability of empiricism to account for the structure of the 
aesthetic phenomenon. Secondly, the reason why he then connects the aesthetic 
perception to the transcendental idea of freedom is delicate and deserves a 
further explanation: Epistemologically the aesthetic phenomenon is based on 
the powers of cognition. We are told that imagination works independently of 
but still in concordance with understanding. This “free regularity” seems a 
paradox but it might be explained by an example: The interplay of the powers 
of cognition could be compared to an act of dancing in which the two 
partners coordinate their movements with the other, i.e. is dependent, but at 
the same time forms a unity with the other in such a way that making one pair 
their act – the dance - is free24. Illustrated by this analogy it is not difficult to 
understand why Kant can connect the aesthetic attitude to the idea of 
freedom and account for the characteristic delight we experience by the 
perception of beauty. But still, despite this convincing explanation of the 
subjective effect of the aesthetic attitude it remains to be explained what it is 
about the object that activates the cognitive powers in such a way that a 
certain aesthetic delight arises. In this paper I have tried to follow the 
objective path arguing that what Kant calls the aesthetic and teleological 
judgment have both ontological and epistemological conditions. Teleology 
contains concepts necessary for a distinct understanding of organic life. 
                                                          
23 Kant (1952): 14. 
24 This analogy is proposed by Dieter Henrich to explain the apparent paradox of 
imagination: “The harmonious agreement of the cognitive powers, thus conceived, is 
playful in the particular sense: the mutual agreement comes about without coercion, and 
the two activities concur automatically. The play can thus be compared to a dance of two 
partners who harmonize in their movements without influencing each other and who enjoy 
their joint performance”. Cf. Henrich (1992)  
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Aesthetic judgment supports this and proceeds further to show that an 
analysis of beauty reveals an ability to vitalize the cognitive powers and as 
such it can supply conceptual knowledge.       
This justifies the following account for the interplay of the cognitive 
powers: By means of understanding we know the species of nature but only 
via concepts which we construe through abstraction from intuition. This leaves 
us with a divide between concepts and sensibly given objects, between 
thought and being. The divide is an epistemic problem for the cognition of 
organic beings since concepts are incapable of grasping life. Therefore to 
overcome the division, the concepts must be vitalized. This can be brought 
about by the activity of imagination through which concepts are reunited with 
sensuous intuition. In the beauty of nature the organic feature appears as such 
in the socalled “free formations” and in fine art knowledge is expressed 
vividly through images. Kant’s accentuation of free beauty as the quality that 
distinguishes fine art aesthetically does not exclude cognition. On the 
contrary, the free beauty of a work of fine art shows that the work is objective 
in the sense that it is independent of subjective, i.e. deliberate and arbitrary, 
intentions because it represents nature’s prescription of its rules through the 
artist.  
In the aesthetic attiude we thus vitalize our abstract, rigid concepts with 
the life of the sensuous phenomenon through the creative power of 
imagination. This mutual rapproachment between understanding and 
sensation means that the free and regular play of imagination does not just 
produce a pleasant feeling by appealing to our sensible nature; combined with 
understanding imagination becomes an organ for cognising the organic 
being´s living self-actualisation. And the refreshment and strengthening of the 
feeling of life which the free and regular life of the living phenomenon causes 
in our sensible nature through the cooperation of our understanding and 
imagination is a subjective effect in our empirical character caused by a being 
which is more than just material. This idea that the experience of beauty 
contains both an objective, cognitive and a subjective, sensuous aspect is 
almost expressed by Goethe in his tentative definition of beauty from 1792: 
“The sight of the regular living in its highest activity and perfection which 
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